Local 787 v. Textron Lycoming by unknown
1997 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-7-1997 
Local 787 v. Textron Lycoming 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997 
Recommended Citation 
"Local 787 v. Textron Lycoming" (1997). 1997 Decisions. 147. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/147 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1997 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed July 7, 1997 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 96-7261 
 
UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND 
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, 
INTERNATIONAL UNION AND ITS LOCAL 787, 
APPELLANT 
 
v. 
 
TEXTRON LYCOMING RECIPROCATING ENGINE 
DIVISION, AVCO CORP., 
APPELLEE 
 
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 95-cv-01918) 
 
Argued: JANUARY 30, 1997 
 
Before: BECKER, ROTH, Circuit Judges, 
BARRY, District Judge.* 
 
(Filed: July 7, 1997) 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
*Honorable Maryanne Trump Barry, United States District Judge for the 
District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. 
JORDAN ROSSEN, ESQUIRE 
General Counsel 
International Union, United 
 Automobile Aerospace and 
 Agricultural Implement 
 Workers of America, UAW 
8000 East Jefferson Avenue 
Detroit, Michigan 48214 
 
STEPHEN A. YOKICH, ESQUIRE 
(ARGUED) 
Associate General Counsel 
International Union, United 
 Automobile Aerospace and 
 Agricultural Implement 
 Workers of America, UAW 
1757 "N" Street, NW 
Washington, DC 20036 
 
Attorneys for Appellant 
 
BARRY SIMON, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 
GARY M. TOCCI, ESQUIRE 
Schnader, Harrison, Segal, & Lewis 
1600 Market Street, Suite 3600 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
CHARLES J. McKELVEY, ESQUIRE 
McNerney, Page, Vanderlin & Hall 
433 Market Street 
P.O. Box 7 
Williamsport, PA 17703 
 
Attorneys for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is an appeal by the United Automobile, Aerospace 
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America ("UAW") 
and its Local 787 from the district court's order dismissing 
its complaint against defendant Textron Lycoming 
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Reciprocating Engine Division, Avco Corp. ("Textron"), for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 301(a) of the 
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The 
district court found that the UAW's suit, which seeks a 
declaration that the collective bargaining agreement 
between the parties is voidable because it was secured by 
fraud in the inducement, was not a "[s]uit for violation of [a] 
contract[ ] between an employer and a labor organization 
representing employees" within the meaning of § 301(a). 
 
The UAW's appeal requires us to consider the scope of 
§ 301(a) and our decision in Mack Trucks, Inc. v. 
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and 
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 856 F.2d 579 
(3d Cir. 1988). In that case, Mack Trucks sought a 
declaratory judgment that the collective bargaining 
agreement between it and the UAW was valid and 
enforceable, after the UAW had threatened to declare that 
there was no agreement between the parties. We held that 
§ 301(a) conferred subject matter jurisdiction, finding that 
Mack Trucks' suit was a "suit for violation of[a] contract[ ]." 
Id. at 588. 
 
In urging us to affirm the district court's order in this 
case, Textron contends that the suit filed by the UAW, here 
the party seeking to establish jurisdiction, can be 
distinguished from Mack Trucks in two respects. First, 
Textron points out that, while the very existence of the 
collective bargaining agreement was at issue in Mack 
Trucks, the UAW here acknowledges the existence of the 
agreement, and rather seeks a declaration that the 
collective bargaining agreement between the parties is 
voidable because it was secured by fraud in the 
inducement. Second, while in Mack Trucks the plaintiff 
wished to enforce the collective bargaining agreement, the 
UAW here seeks the power to repudiate the agreement, and 
Textron contends that § 301(a) does not supply jurisdiction 
under such circumstances. Because we disagree with 
Textron and conclude that the UAW's suit is a suit for 
violation of a contract under § 301(a) and Mack Trucks, we 
reverse. 
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I. 
 
The complaint pleads the following facts which, since we 
deal with a motion to dismiss, we must take as true. The 
UAW represents employees at Textron's Williamsport, 
Pennsylvania plant, at which the company manufactures 
and assembles aircraft engines. This dispute arose from the 
collective bargaining agreement between the parties that 
covered the period from April 1, 1994 to April 1, 1997 and, 
more specifically, the negotiations that produced that 
agreement. Prior to the commencement of negotiations, the 
UAW submitted to Textron a request for information to aid 
it in its preparations for the negotiations. One section of the 
request asked whether Textron planned to subcontract out 
any of the work that was being done by the UAW members 
at the plant. The request specifically demanded any written 
documents that Textron had prepared on the subject of 
subcontracting. The UAW twice repeated this request. Prior 
to the negotiations, Textron never disclosed any information 
about plans to move bargaining unit work. 
 
At the opening of the negotiations, the UAW renewed its 
request that Textron disclose any plans to contract out the 
work. Textron's vice-president for human resources, Frank 
Ratchford, stated that he had no knowledge of any plans for 
subcontracting, and also promised to make sure that his 
knowledge was complete. Neither Ratchford nor any other 
Textron official raised this issue again during negotiations. 
The parties reached a collective bargaining agreement in 
March 1994, which was ratified by the UAW membership at 
the beginning of April 1994. 
 
The UAW's complaint alleges that, during the 
negotiations, Textron developed a plan to subcontract 
certain bargaining unit work at the plant, but never 
disclosed it to the UAW. According to the UAW's 
submission, the plan was presented to and approved by 
Textron's Board of Directors after the UAW membership 
ratified the collective bargaining agreement. The 
membership learned of the plan in June 1994. 
 
The UAW alleges that about half of the union's members 
at the plant will lose their jobs as a result of Textron's 
subcontracting plan. It also represents that it would have 
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used a different bargaining strategy had it known of the 
company's subcontracting plan. Instead, relying on the 
company's denial of any such plan, the union made no 
contract demands relating to the issue and did not pursue 
its request for information on the subject. More specifically, 
the union represents that it would not have agreed to the 
"no-strike" provision in the collective bargaining agreement 
had it known of the subcontracting plan. 
 
The UAW's complaint in the District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania sought a declaratory judgment that 
the collective bargaining agreement was voidable at the 
UAW's option because it was secured by fraud in the 
inducement. The UAW relied on § 301(a) of the Labor 
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), for subject 
matter jurisdiction. Textron moved to dismiss the complaint 
on two grounds: (1) § 301(a) failed to confer subject matter 
jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), because the National 
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") has exclusive jurisdiction 
over the UAW's claims of bad faith bargaining; and (2) the 
UAW failed to state a claim for relief that could be granted, 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), because it had failed to exhaust the 
grievance process available under the collective bargaining 
agreement. 
 
The district court granted Textron's motion based on the 
first ground, and, accordingly, did not reach the second 
question. The court first concluded that the UAW sought 
neither to enforce its rights under the collective bargaining 
agreement nor to show that a collective bargaining 
agreement existed; rather, the UAW had requested only a 
declaration that Textron had violated its duty to bargain in 
good faith under § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act 
("NLRA") in negotiating the agreement. Having so 
characterized UAW's suit, the district court found that it 
lacked jurisdiction under § 301, and that the case was 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. 
 
Moreover, the court reasoned that, while we held in Mack 
Trucks that a district court has jurisdiction to determine 
whether a collective bargaining agreement exists, that 
holding was "based on the principle that a district court 
may enforce the parties' rights under a CBA, but may not 
reach a claim which is independent of the contract." The 
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court found that the UAW's claim was independent of the 
terms of the contract. It concluded finally that, "[i]n no way 
can UAW's claim be classified as one for `violation of [a] 
contract[ ] between an employer and a labor organization' 
under § 301(a)." Order at 6. 
 
The UAW appeals, contending that the district court 
erred in concluding that § 301(a), as interpreted by our 
decision in Mack Trucks, does not confer jurisdiction over 
its suit. Our review of the order dismissing the complaint is 
plenary. See Packard v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 
1039, 1044 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
II. 
 
This case requires us to examine again the relationship 
between the jurisdiction of the NLRB and that of the federal 
district courts over labor cases. As we explained in Mack 
Trucks, 856 F.2d at 584-85, under the preemption doctrine 
of San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 
236, 245 (1959), "[w]hen an activity is arguably subject to 
§ 7 or § 8 of the [National Labor Relations] Act, the States 
as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive 
competence of the National Labor Relations Board."1 The 
purpose of the Garmon preemption doctrine is both to 
ensure the uniform development of substantive labor law 
rules and to entrust the development of those rules to an 
administrative agency with particular labor law expertise. 
See Vaca v. Snipes, 386 U.S. 171, 178-81 (1967); Mack 
Trucks, 856 F.2d at 584. 
 
This doctrine, however, "has never been rigidly applied to 
cases where it could not fairly be inferred that Congress 
intended exclusive jurisdiction to lie with the NLRB." Vaca, 
386 U.S. at 179. In § 301(a) of the Labor Management 
Relations Act, Congress "carved out" such an exception to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB over cases arguably 
subject to § 7 or § 8 of the NLRA. Id. This section provides: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 7 of the NLRA concerns the right of employees to organize and 
to engage in collective bargaining, 29 U.S.C. § 157, and § 8 prohibits 
both employers and unions from committing "unfair labor practices" as 
defined in the statute, id. § 158. 
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"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a 
labor organization representing employees . . . may be 
brought in any district court of the United States having 
jurisdiction over the parties." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Hence, a 
federal district court has jurisdiction over suits "for 
violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 
organization representing employees" under § 301(a) even if 
the claimed harm may arguably constitute an unfair labor 
practice under the NLRA. Under these circumstances-- 
when the challenged practice both violates the collective 
bargaining agreement and is arguably subject to the NLRA 
-- the federal district courts and the NLRB are said to 
share "concurrent jurisdiction" over the suit. Mack Trucks, 
856 F.2d at 585. In other words, the NLRB retains 
exclusive jurisdiction over a claim only when the challenged 
conduct is an unfair labor practice that is not also subject 
to § 301(a) jurisdiction. 
 
The purpose of § 301(a) was to encourage the judicial 
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. In 
enacting § 301, Congress recognized the importance, for 
promoting industrial peace, of " `assuring the enforceability 
of [collective bargaining agreements]' in the courts." Id. at 
587 (quoting Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 509 
(1962)). Moreover, § 301 "authorizes federal courts to 
fashion a body of law for the enforcement of . . . collective 
bargaining agreements," Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln 
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957), and, accordingly, 
encourages the development of a such a body of law. As the 
Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he strong policy favoring 
judicial enforcement of collective-bargaining contracts was 
sufficiently powerful to sustain the jurisdiction of the 
district courts over enforcement suits even though the 
conduct involved was arguably or would amount to an 
unfair labor practice within the jurisdiction of the National 
Labor Relations Board." Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 
424 U.S. 554, 562 (1976). 
 
III. 
 
In Mack Trucks, we considered whether § 301(a) supplied 
subject matter jurisdiction over suits about the very 
existence of a collective bargaining agreement, or whether 
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that section was limited to suits that posited the existence 
of the agreement and merely alleged a breach of that 
agreement. The UAW and Mack Trucks had reached an oral 
agreement about the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement. While the parties were negotiating contract 
language to reflect the oral agreement, the UAWfiled a 
grievance alleging that Mack Trucks had unilaterally 
implemented changes to that agreement. Soon after, the 
union threatened that, unless the parties settled their 
disputes and executed a written agreement within a certain 
period of time, it would declare the agreement void. 856 
F.2d at 582-83. Mack Trucks filed suit in federal district 
court pursuant to § 301(a) seeking a declaratory judgment 
that the new collective bargaining agreement was valid and 
enforceable. 
 
The UAW, in that case challenging § 301(a) jurisdiction, 
responded that the court lacked jurisdiction because the 
suit did not concern a contract claim, but rather implicated 
only the duties under the NLRA to bargain collectively and 
in good faith and to reduce the terms of an oral agreement 
to writing, which are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the NLRB. We rejected this argument, noting that even if a 
suit is subject to the NLRB's jurisdiction, we must 
determine whether it is also subject to § 301(a) jurisdiction. 
We found further that Mack Trucks' suit did not turn 
"solely on violations of good faith bargaining, or the duty to 
execute an agreement . . . which would trigger the NLRB's 
exclusive jurisdiction." Id. at 586 (citations omitted and 
emphasis added). 
 
We then addressed the central question, whether "suits 
for violation of contracts" included suits concerning the 
validity of a labor agreement, or whether § 301(a) 
jurisdiction was limited to suits alleging violations of 
particular contractual provisions in an existing collective 
bargaining agreement. We noted that several courts of 
appeals have limited jurisdiction to suits alleging a breach 
of a particular provision of a collective bargaining 
agreement. See A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. International Union, 
United Mine Workers of America, 799 F.2d 142, 146 (4th 
Cir. 1986); NDK Corp. v. Local 1550 of Commercial Workers 
Int'l Union, 709 F.2d 491, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1983); 
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Hernandez v. National Packing Co., 455 F.2d 1252, 1253 
(1st Cir. 1972). 
 
Because § 301(a) "is not free from ambiguity, we 
interpret[ed] § 301(a) in light of its legislative history, 
congressional intent, and underlying policies." Mack Trucks, 
856 F.2d at 586. In view of these sources, we first 
concluded that limiting § 301(a) jurisdiction to suits that 
presume the existence of a labor contract "ignores 
Congress' broader concern that the courts -- as opposed to 
the NLRB -- be granted authority to decide disputes of a 
contractual nature." Id. at 588. We held that: 
 
When, as here, a party seeks enforcement of a labor 
agreement, and the other party denies the contract's 
existence, the filing party's declaratory judgment action 
constitutes an `enforcement' action. Congress intended 
that contractual disputes be resolved by the courts 
applying `usual processes of the law.' These principles 
of law apply equally to cases involving breach of an 
acknowledged contract and those involving a dispute 
over the agreement's existence. 
 
Id. (citation omitted). In so holding, we distinguished prior 
cases in which we had found no § 301 jurisdiction on the 
ground that the claims in those cases were each somehow 
independent of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 
589. For example, in one case, the plaintiffs claimed that 
their collective bargaining agreement conflicted with a pre- 
agreement contract of hire. See Leskiw v. Local 1470, Int'l 
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 464 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1972); see also 
Adams v. Budd, 349 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1965); Medlin v. 
Boeing Vertol Co., 620 F.2d 957 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 
IV. 
 
A. 
 
The UAW, back before us and this time trying to 
establish jurisdiction, contends that § 301(a) confers federal 
jurisdiction over its complaint, characterizing Mack Trucks 
as holding that § 301(a) jurisdiction exists for suits 
involving questions about the enforceability of a collective 
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bargaining agreement. Textron responds that the district 
court properly dismissed the UAW's complaint for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction under § 301(a) and Mack Trucks. 
First, Textron points out that Mack Trucks dealt with 
whether a collective bargaining agreement actually existed 
between the parties. Because the UAW's claim here is that 
the collective bargaining agreement is voidable (but not 
void) because it was secured by fraud in the inducement, 
and the UAW has acknowledged the existence of the 
agreement, Mack Trucks does not, Textron submits, compel 
the conclusion that § 301(a) confers jurisdiction. Second, 
even if Mack Trucks establishes § 301(a) jurisdiction for 
some suits that concern the enforceability of a collective 
bargaining agreement, the argument continues, § 301(a) 
supplies jurisdiction only when a party seeks to enforce a 
collective bargaining agreement but not when a party seeks 
to repudiate one, as in this case. 
 
We agree with the UAW, and conclude that § 301(a), as 
interpreted by Mack Trucks, confers jurisdiction over the 
UAW's fraudulent inducement suit. Taking up first 
Textron's contention that Mack Trucks does not supply 
jurisdiction when the plaintiff seeks to repudiate the 
agreement, we believe that the language of Mack Trucks 
itself -- that a suit "involving a dispute over the 
agreement's existence" is subject to § 301(a) jurisdiction -- 
compels the result that a party challenging an agreement's 
existence can establish § 301(a) jurisdiction.2 
 
Moreover, in Mack Trucks, we distinguished a case in 
which the Fourth Circuit held, in a consolidated appeal, 
that § 301(a) supplied jurisdiction over a union's suit for a 
declaration that an existing collective bargaining agreement 
applied to particular employers, but not to an employer's 
suit challenging the existence of that agreement. See A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., 799 F.2d at 146. We stated that this "view 
fails to articulate a legal basis to justify jurisdiction in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We acknowledged as much recently when we stated that the "basis of 
Section 301 jurisdiction in Mack" was a claim that "no contract 
exist[ed]." Beverly Enterprises--Pennsylvania, Inc. v. District 1199C 
National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, 90 F.3d 93, 95 
(3d Cir. 1996). 
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union case, but not in the employer's case." Mack Trucks, 
856 F.2d at 588 n.10. 
 
Additionally, we see no reason why the rationale behind 
Mack Trucks -- that by enacting § 301(a) Congress intended 
that the courts resolve disputes of a contractual nature, 
including disputes over the agreement's very existence -- 
does not also apply when the party who files suit seeks a 
declaration that the agreement is not enforceable. Our 
conclusion is buttressed in policy terms by the UAW's 
argument that jurisdiction lies in this case because the 
union would have raised the fraudulent inducement claim 
as an affirmative defense had it refused to abide by the 
collective bargaining agreement and Textron hadfiled suit 
under § 301 to enforce it: the development of a consistent 
body of law in this area depends, in part, on federal court 
jurisdiction over all claims of a contractual nature, no 
matter who first resorts to court. 
 
Textron also seeks to distinguish between suits 
concerning the existence of an agreement and those 
concerning its enforceability. As the foregoing discussion 
suggests, we do not believe that there is any difference 
under Mack Trucks between suits about the existence of a 
collective bargaining agreement, i.e., seeking declaratory 
judgment that the agreement is void, and suits, like this 
one, about the enforceability of a collective bargaining 
agreement, i.e., seeking declaratory judgment that an 
agreement is voidable at the will of that party. The UAW's 
suit clearly arises from a contractual dispute: a dispute 
about whether a contract was secured by fraudulent 
inducement is as much a contract dispute as a dispute 
about a contract's existence. As we explained in Mack 
Trucks, Congress intended that such suits be"resolved by 
the courts applying `usual processes of the law.' " Mack 
Trucks, 856 F.2d at 588. 
 
The Ninth Circuit has already held that § 301(a) confers 
jurisdiction over fraudulent inducement claims. See 
Rozay's Transfer v. Local Freight Drivers, 850 F.2d 1321, 
1326 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Section 301 . . . applies not only to 
suits for breach of a collective bargaining agreement once it 
is duly formed, but also to suits impugning the existence 
and validity of a labor agreement, including those alleging 
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improper conduct or mistake during the formation of the 
agreement." (citations omitted)); International Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. American Delivery Serv. Co., 50 F.3d 770, 
773-74 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that § 301(a) 
supplies jurisdiction over the UAW's suit alleging that 
Textron secured the collective bargaining agreement 
between the parties by fraud in the inducement. 
 
B. 
 
We are also unpersuaded by Textron's contention that 
the UAW's suit does not give rise to § 301(a) jurisdiction 
because it arises from pre-contract rights, that is, rights 
that are "independent" of the collective bargaining 
agreement. It bases this conclusion on its understanding 
that the UAW's claims stem from the negotiation of the 
agreement, not from an alleged violation of the terms of the 
agreement itself, and as such, allege only a violation of the 
duty to bargain in good faith under the NLRA. In making 
this argument, Textron relies on several cases which we 
distinguished in Mack Trucks, see 856 F.2d at 589, in 
which we held that § 301(a) did not provide jurisdiction. See 
Medlin v. Boeing Vertol Co., 620 F.2d 957 (3d Cir. 1980); 
Leskiw v. Local 1470, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 464 F.2d 
721 (3d Cir. 1972); Adams v. Budd Co., 349 F.2d 368 (3d 
Cir. 1965). In essence, Textron contends that the UAW's 
claim is more akin to the pre-Mack Trucks cases than it is 
to the suit in Mack Trucks. 
 
In Adams, the plaintiffs, employees subject to a collective 
bargaining agreement, sought jurisdiction under§ 301(a) to 
press the claim that the union and Budd had conspired, in 
negotiating the collective bargaining agreement, to deprive 
them of rights contained in their pre-collective bargaining 
agreement "contracts of hire." Recognizing that these 
plaintiffs did not allege a violation of the collective 
bargaining agreement, but rather a "violation by a labor 
contract of rights which they assert were independently, 
and pre-agreement, vested in them by their `contract of 
hire,' " we held that the plaintiffs had not established 
§ 301(a) jurisdiction. Adams, 349 F.2d at 370; accord 
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Leskiw, 464 F.2d at 723; see also Medlin, 620 F.2d at 962 
(refusing to exercise jurisdiction under § 301(a) where the 
plaintiffs' claims were based on rights independent of the 
collective bargaining agreement: "[T]hese were not rights 
arising in any way under the collective bargaining 
agreement."). 
 
We disagree with Textron, because the UAW's suit is not 
akin to the pre-Mack Trucks cases. As we characterized 
them in Beverly Enterprises, those cases held "that federal 
courts lack Section 301 jurisdiction over challenges to 
contracts on the basis that they conflicted with the NLRA or 
some other external agreement." Beverly Enterprises -- 
Pennsylvania, Inc. v. District 1199C National Union of 
Hospital and Health Care Employees, 90 F.3d 93, 95 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of a complaint where the 
plaintiff sought only a declaration that a clause in the 
collective bargaining agreement violated § 8(a)(3) of the 
NLRA). We thus reject Textron's contention that the 
plaintiffs in Adams failed to establish§ 301(a) jurisdiction 
because their claim turned solely upon adverse effects 
arising from the negotiation of the collective bargaining 
agreement. While we agreed with the defendant union's 
argument in Adams that the suit had to do with the 
negotiation of the agreement rather than whether the 
agreement had been breached, see Adams, 349 F.2d at 
369, our conclusion that § 301(a) did not confer jurisdiction 
was based on the fact that the plaintiffs' suit alleged a 
violation of their rights contained in a pre-agreement 
contract, not on the fact that the plaintiffs' claim concerned 
the negotiations rather than the collective bargaining 
agreement itself. 
 
Contrary to the pre-Mack Trucks line of cases, the UAW's 
claim that the collective bargaining agreement was secured 
by fraud in the inducement arises not out of the NLRA or 
another contract, but out of the collective bargaining 
agreement itself. The claim alleges flaws in the basic 
formation of the collective bargaining agreement, and its 
resolution is integral to the question whether the agreement 
is enforceable. In other words, Textron's allegedly 
fraudulent conduct goes to the heart of the enforceability of 
the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. 
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 Thus, the UAW is seeking to enforce rights that exist under 
the collective bargaining agreement. 
 
In short, the claim here can be adjudicated without 
consideration of rights possessed by the parties under any 
other agreement or the NLRA. As such, this case clearly 
does not fall within the pre-Mack Trucks line of cases. 
Hence, even if the UAW's claim could arguably constitute 
an unfair labor practice under § 7 or § 8 of the NLRA, the 
UAW's claim is not solely a claim under the NLRA, and is 
subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of both the federal 
district courts and the NLRB.3 
 
The order of the district court dismissing the complaint 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction will be reversed and 
the case remanded for further proceedings.4 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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3. In this regard, we note that it is not clear that the NLRB actually 
would have jurisdiction over the UAW's fraudulent inducement claim. 
According to the UAW, the duty to bargain in good faith under §§ 8(a)(5) 
and 8(d) of the NLRA is qualitatively different from its fraud in the 
inducement claim. While the claims of bad faith bargaining and of 
fraudulent inducement may overlap both factually and legally, they are 
not identical. 
 
4. Textron has also argued that the UAW's complaint must be dismissed 
because the union failed to exhaust the grievance procedures contained 
in the collective bargaining agreement before filing suit. The district 
court did not reach this issue when it dismissed the complaint, and 
should do so on remand.                                 
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